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Abstract 
A recent report by the United Nations and the World Bank argues that the world has seen “a 
surge in violent conflicts in recent years”, with a sharp increase in reported battle-related and 
terrorist attacks, and calls for preventive action to ensure that increasing conflict does not 
undermine the UN Sustainable Development Goals. I will argue that this is a far too pessimistic 
assessment of conflict trends and not borne out the available evidence, which indicates a decline 
in violent conflict since the end of the Cold War. Alarmist warnings may seem helpful to call for 
action, but they detract attention from what we can learn about the causes for why conflict has 
declined. For example, resort to violence has become less frequent where factors that can 
motivate resort to violence such as political and ethnic exclusion have decreased. Moreover, 
conflict of interest does not imply violence, and the space for nonviolent alternatives has 
increased. The future of conflict and peace depends on our confidence in whether positive 
changes will continue and our understanding of the possible challenges.  
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Introduction  
Since this is my inaugural lecture as the Regius Professor of Political Science, I would like to 
start by thanking the University of Essex, for awarding me the title, and Her Majesty the Queen, 
for agreeing to set up the position itself, and the recognition that this entails of my own field. I 
am of course flattered that I have been found to be suitable to hold this unique professorship in 
Political Science. But I would like to add that if I have accomplished anything as a political 
scientist, then this is also to a large extent because I have been fortunate to work in supportive 
environments such as the University of Essex, and I have also had excellent collaborators, 
including many former and current students who are here today.  
Isaac Newton is often quoted on his statement that if he had seen further than others in 
his work then it was by “standing on the shoulders of giants”.1 I very much agree that research is 
a cumulative process (see, e.g., Holt et al. 2016, Zinnes 1976). However, I do not think 
everything we achieve need to rest on the works of giants as such. In my view, an anthill is a 
much more helpful picture of how we typically build progress in science. We can achieve much 
more progress if we like ants focus on involving larger numbers of people and we all try to work 
together. 
The specific topic that I would like to talk about here is whether we have clear trends in 
conflict, and whether we really have a more violent world as many seem to think. In answering 
this question, I will draw on a literal anthill of work, with research that I have conducted myself, 
often in collaboration with others, as well as many important things that I have learned from the 
contributions of other scholars.  
                                                          
1 This quote appears in Newton’s 1675 letter to Robert Hooke, available in digital form at 
https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/objects/9792.  
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An ever more violent world? 
Many people are definitely convinced that we are living in a very dangerous world with very 
serious threats to security. They also argue things are not just very bad at the present, they are 
also getting worse over time.  The 2015 UK Strategic Defence Review, for example, stated that 
“threats to the UK country are growing” (p. 5).2 To justify this growth in threats it made 
references to the rise of the Islamic State, the greater general instability in the Middle East, and 
the crisis in Ukraine. At a meeting at the Royal United Services Institute earlier in 2018, Chief of 
the General Staff in the UK, General Nick Carter reaffirmed the analysis from the Strategic 
Defence Review.3 But he also warned that “threats have diversified and become more serious”, 
and they had done so at a faster pace than anticipated. On the other side of the Atlantic, former 
Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has gone one step further, and 
argued in a statement to the US congress that we live in a world “more dangerous than it has ever 
been” (for an extended discussion, see Preble and Mueller 2014). 
 It is worth pausing to digest exactly what this entails. If we take Dempsey’s claim 
literally, then it would mean that the world at the present is more dangerous than during the peak 
of World War II, the deadliest conflict on record in absolute terms. It would also be more 
dangerous than previous periods of even more intense warfare in relative terms, or share of 
                                                          
2 For the full text of the report, see  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf 
3 For the full transcript, see https://rusi.org/event/dynamic-security-threats-and-british-army. 
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people affected, such as the Thirty Years War, where some European countries lost over a 
quarter of their population (Theibault 1997).  
Some might argue that these statements about how we are currently living in dangerous 
times are based on things that could happen, rather than claims that we necessarily have a more 
violent world right now.4 But many similar claims also come up in analyses that claim to present 
data and analyses on actual violence.  
For example, the so-called Global Peace Index by the Institute of Economic and Peace 
argues in the 2017 release of their report that violence is increasing, and that by their measure, 
only “10 countries … can be considered free from conflict”.5 Moreover, the United Nations and 
World Bank (2018) recently published a new report called Pathways for Peace. The main 
purpose of the report is to advocate for more efforts to prevent violent conflict. But in trying to 
make a case for this they also highlighted how that violence is becoming more widespread and 
the world is more dangerous. The executive summary makes several strong claims, for example 
that “In 2016, more countries experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly 30 years … 
battle-related deaths have increased tenfold … and terrorist attacks and fatalities … rose 
sharply”. It warns that “If current trends persist, by 2030 more than half of the world’s poor will 
                                                          
4 For example, Dempsey acknowledges that we “live in an era where we’re at an evolutionary 
low in violence” but holds that “the chance of violence and those using violence for ideological 
and other purposes is exponentially greater”, see quote in 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/14/dempseys-paradox/. 
5 Se https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/global-peace-index-2016-there-are-
now-only-10-countries-in-the-world-that-are-not-at-war-a7069816.html 
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be … affected by … violence”. It also notes that this will make it hard to reach the United 
Nations sustainable development targets. 
As a conflict researcher, I have spent a great deal of time developing and working with 
data on violent conflict. And I simply cannot reconcile these very pessimistic claims about a 
more violent and dangerous world with the data that we have.  Rather, the data in my view 
confirm that conflict remains widespread, but if there is a trend over time, then it seems to be in 
the other direction, towards less conflict. But you do not need to just take my word for this over 
those of others - we can actually look at the data that we have on violent conflict.  
Figure 1 shows a data set on instances of wars involving independent states from 1816 to 
the present, using an update version of the data described in Gleditsch (2004). The data are 
largely based on the definition of war suggested by the Correlates of War project, emphasizing 
conflict between organized armies, claiming more than 1000s battle deaths (Most and Starr 1983, 
Sambanis 2004, Small and Singer 1982). Figure distinguishes between interstate wars between 
states and civil wars where a state fights with a non-state actor. Each point in the bars in this 
figure is an ongoing conflict in that year, with color indicating the specific type.  
Figure 1: Distribution of interstate and civil wars, 1816-2017 
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Figure 1 highlights a number of important changes in the number of wars over time. First, 
it is clear that interstate conflicts (shown in red) have never been very common. Yet, it is notable 
that we have not had any interstate conflict at the level of a war since the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
(see Gleditsch and Pickering 2014). Second, we can see that civil wars became more common 
with decolonialization after World War II (see also Miranda, Perondi and Gleditsch 2016). Third, 
we have a peak in the number of ongoing civil wars after the end of Cold War in the early 1990s. 
However, after this peak, we have seen a decline in the number of ongoing civil wars (see 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig 2017).  These trends are clearly not consistent with the 
claim that we live in an ever more violent world. Even if there is some increase after 2011, this is 
not enough to get the number of ongoing conflicts up to previous peaks.  Finally, we can also see 
that wars and civil wars were common before World II and during the 19th century. This is all the 
more remarkable since there were fewer established states and a lower population, and the record 
of violent events is probably much less complete, especially outside Europe.  
So, how can people claim that we have more wars or that the present is particularly 
violent? One way to reach such conclusions is to use somewhat creative accounting, where one 
counts more violent events, or one consider more things as distinct conflicts or wars over time. 
For example, many people also include smaller violent events in counts of conflicts, or they 
differentiate between actors and aims in conflict to identify more distinct conflicts (see, e.g., 
Harrison and Wolf 2012). For example, some sources count all instances where the Islamic State 
carries out terrorist attacks in different states as separate civil wars since they fight different 
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governments.6 There could be good reasons for these types of measures or refining our 
definitions, and casting the net wider than the wars or the most severe violent conflicts. But if we 
want to look at trends then we must be consistent over time, and we should be skeptical of 
apparent trends that may be due to changes in the standards applied (see Gleditsch and Beardsley 
2010).   
Instead of trying to make decisions about what constitutes a distinct conflict and counting 
each war irrespective of its size as a single data point, we can look at a simple measure of the 
total number of people killed in warfare (see Richardson 1960). If we consider the fatalities in 
war, then we also see no evidence for the assertion that the contemporary world is more 
dangerous. If anything, the decline in the number of warfare casualties seems even more 
dramatic. 
Figure 2 shows data on deaths in a wider range of violent conflicts from the Uppsala 
Armed Conflict Data, and this also includes armed conflicts with less than 1000 battle deaths 
(see Gleditsch et al. 2002). But even using this wider definition, we see a decline rather than an 
increase in the number of battle deaths. We can also see that here the decline in deaths starts 
earlier, before end of the Cold War. Of course, the current civil war in Syria is a very severe 
conflict, and we see some upward movement at the end of the period. However, the number of 
people killed overall remains lower than in earlier decades, and the Syrian civil war is not as 
severe as previous wars such Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, where many sources such as the 
                                                          
6 For a discussion of how this is handled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, see 
https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/. 
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Correlates of War project has estimated that as many as 1.25 million died in combat.7 Hence, 
regardless of whether we look at counts of wars or deaths based on the most direct measure of 
severity, there is simply no evidence that we see more violence due to warfare. Rather, the data 
indicate that the violence observed has declined.  
 
 
Figure 2: Battledeaths in war, by type, 1946-2017 
 
Some people argue that it is misleading to look only at traditional warfare or conventional 
conflict. They claim that we have had a transformation of war, where the “old wars” have given 
form to “new wars”, with unconventional forms of conflict such as terrorist tactics becoming 
more widespread (Gray 2015, Kaldor 2006, Mann 2018). We can find some apparent support for 
this view in the available data on terrorism. The so-called Global Terrorism Database (LaFree 
and Dugan 2007), for example, clearly appears to report a higher number of terrorist attacks over 
                                                          
7 For a discussion of the death toll estimates for the Iran Iraq conflict, see 
https://kurzman.unc.edu/death-tolls-of-the-iran-iraq-war/. 
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time, especially since the mid-2000s.8 Figure 3 displays the total number of attacks most recent 
version of the GTD data. 
 
Figure 3: Number of terrorist attacks, with shading by whether the location country is involved in 
a civil war or not 
 
However, there is really no evidence in these data that we have an explosion of terrorist 
attacks instead of conventional civil war, as the strict version of the New Wars thesis suggests. 
Once we start inspecting the underlying data, then it becomes clear that most of the events 
reported in the Global Terrorism Database are attacks in countries already at civil war. In 
                                                          
8 For an alarmist headline making this point, see https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/nov/18/fivefold-increase-terrorism-fatalities-global-index. However, subsequent 
releases acknowledge that terrorism overall has declined, see e.g., the discussion in 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/15/terrorist-attacks-are-quietly-declining-
around-world/?utm_term=.468f0a32311e. 
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particular, the bulk of the events are attacks that place in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In Figure 3 have 
shaded black all the attacks that place in countries in civil war. We can see that this includes 
most events and the proportion is actually increasing. If we look at the residual grey area on top 
which are the attacks in countries without civil war, then we see a limited number of events and 
no clear increase in attacks. If we look at the absolute numbers for these events alone, shown as 
the dashed red line, then there is no trend. Hence, if we have more terrorism, then it is only 
because we have more attacks in ongoing civil wars.9  
Some have also argued that we have more reported terrorist attacks because we now 
interpret more outbreaks of violence as terrorism (see Human Security Report 2007). For 
example, in the past, many would have considered the events included in Afghanistan and Iraq as 
guerrilla attacks or violence against civilians. Moreover, most recorded terrorist attacks are not 
lethal, and there is no evidence that terrorism is becoming more lethal. If anything, terrorist 
attacks tended to be more severe in the 1980s, when bombs placed on aircrafts such as in 
Lockerbie disaster were more common (Sandler 2014).  
 
Why is pessimism so pervasive 
This pervasive pessimism about the state of the world is not confined to war and peace. The 
Gapminder project started by late Swedish physician Hans Rosling conducts a multiple choice 
survey on global health and development (https://www.gapminder.org/, see also Rosling 2018).  
                                                          
9 I am currently engaged in collaborative research on why this may be the case with former 
students Sara Polo and Andrea Ruggeri. One important explanation seems to be that we have 
more asymmetric civil wars that favor terrorist tactics by weak rebels against much stronger 
opponents on the government side (see also Polo and Gleditsch 2017).  
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This includes a series of factual questions on such issues as the current global average life 
expectancy and the change in the share of the world’s population living in extreme poverty over 
the last twenty years. Here, we also find that the answers people give tend to be far more 
pessimistic about the outcomes than the data on the actual state of the world. For example, most 
respondents believe that the current average life expectance is much lower than the actual 70 
years. And most people believe that poverty has been rising, even though it has actually halved.  
This survey has been conducted in many countries and many different settings, including 
audiences such as students, bankers, politicians, health activists and even Nobel Prize laureates. 
The respondents all do consistently worse than a random guess, or the share of correct response 
we would expect if they had been submitted by the proverbial chimpanzee throwing darts at the 
score board. But they are also wrong in a very consistent manner, on the side of pessimism. A 
YouGov survey found that the number of pessimists who think world is worse outweigh the 
number of optimists who think things are getting better in all countries examined, save for 
China.10  
Why pessimism is so ingrained in us is a question outside my own area of expertise, and I 
will not dwell on it at any length here.  But one likely important factor is media bias. Bad news is 
more likely to be deemed newsworthy than good news.11 As a result, we are more likely to see 
reports on crises breaking out on the front page than reporting on conflicts that did not occur. 
Moreover, the positive long term trends – if at all covered - will at most show up in the back 
                                                          
10 See https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/01/08/fsafasf. 
11 See, e.g., https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/17/steven-pinker-media-
negative-news. 
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pages. For this reason, data and statistics are important to provide an antidote to the salient but 
often atypical anecdotes. 
Many people are also afraid that not stressing the negatives enough could lead to 
complacency and potentially become an excuse for lack of action. Obviously, it is important to 
be concerned over real problems such the ongoing violence and risk of war. But the major 
problem in just stressing reasons to be afraid and risks is that the road to sinister places often can 
be paved with very good intentions. I will return to this point later. 
 
Documenting the decline of war and its possible causes 
By now we have a large body of research on this decline of violence, popularized by books by 
prominent writers such as the psychologist Steven Pinker (2011) and political scientist Joshua 
Goldstein (2011). Both came to the University of Essex in September 2013 to receive the Book 
of the Year award from the Conflict Research Society.12  
In addition to conventional violent conflict events, we also have similar evidence of 
declining violence in other data sources, including violent crime, as well as clear changes in 
peoples’ views on when it is acceptable to use violence (Pinker 2011). For example, there was a 
time when physical punishment of students would have been considered perfectly normal. That 
is clearly not the case now (Gershoff 2017). Surely both I and my students alike consider this to 
be a very good thing.  
But some critics insist that observing a trend is not the same as establishing changes in 
risk (Cirillo and Taleb 2016, Taleb 2007). One might argue that we have simply been lucky, and 
the decline in violence that we see could just reflect random variation. For example, under a 
                                                          
12 See http://conflictresearchsociety.org/the-conflict-research-society-book-of-the-year/ 
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slightly different turn of events, the Cuban Missile Crisis could have escalated to a war between 
the superpowers, and possibly even with the use of nuclear weapons (Lebow 2009). 
We tend to think of history as the study what happened, and the idea of trying to study 
what could have happened is somewhat alien to many (Fearon 1991, Fergusson 2011, Tetlock 
and Belkin 1996). One way to consider variation more explicitly is to use more formal statistical 
models of risk of different types of conflict, based on the observed data. We can then use such 
models to assess the fit with observed data, derive expected outcomes for new periods, examine 
how likely changes in observed outcomes would be under a model, or assess how strong the 
observed evidence is for fundamental shifts or changes in the underlying distributions such as the 
likelihood of conflict or conflict of a particular severity or magnitude (see, e.g., Clauset, Young 
and Gleditsch 2007, Clauset and Woodard 2013, Clauset 2018, Gleditsch and Clauset 2018). 
This line of work was pioneered by Lewis Fry Richardson, a British physicist and meteorologist, 
who was one of the first to study war and peace from a mathematical perspective (see especially 
the set of articles later published as Richardson 1960).  
Richardson’s work on the study of conflict distributions and trends was never 
mainstream. It remained ignored and peripheral to mainstream conflict research for a long time, 
in part because so many traditional theories of conflict such as realism take as their foundational 
premise that the world just does not change and that the war is inevitable, either due to human 
nature or some form of underlying laws of power. However, trends and comparisons to 
distributional models has now become an active field of research again in light of the interest in 
the decline of violence.  
Many of the recent debates here are quite technical, but I would like to highlight two 
important findings. The bad news is that because the severe wars are very rare, it is also very 
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difficult to say much about declining risk, just because we have not observed a large war for 
some time. For example, my occasional collaborator Aaron Clauset (2018) has estimated that we 
would need at least 100-150 years without major war before we could reliably conclude that the 
risk of severe conflict or a new WWIII had declined.13  
However, the second important finding is that there is also better news in that we have 
more general evidence of structural breaks in the frequency of outbreaks of conflict events. I 
have found in collaborative research evidence that supports a phase transition that we have 
entered a period with less frequent outbreaks after the late 1990s (Cederman, Gleditsch and 
Wucherpfennig 2017). Other scholars from many fields including Mathematics are also doing 
important work that suggests more evidence for qualitative changes (see Fagan et al. 2018).14  
 However, since the focus has been so centered on whether we have a trend or not, we 
have learned less about the possible causes of the declining trend. I think this is important in its 
own right in order to assess risks or judge how dangerous the world is. Whether we can have 
confidence in trends continuing depends on our understanding of causes and whether the 
                                                          
13 His article was picked up by some newspapers in the UK, and the Express chose to publish a 
summary with the headline “Mathematician predicts that world war III is overdue”, see 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/923288/brink-of-war-world-war-3-world-war-2-1945-
long-peace. This is not quite what the article actually says, but the important point remains that it 
is difficult to rule out changes in the likelihood of an infrequent event, and that the risks can 
remain high even if we do not see one for long periods. 
14 For an overview and discussion of ongoing research and a roundtable, see  
https://www.mn.uio.no/math/english/research/projects/focustat/the-focustat-
blog!/krigogfred.html 
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supporting factors for peace will persist. Also, if we have done something right, we need to know 
what it is in order to do more of it (see Mack 2002). 
 
Understanding the decline of ethnic conflict 
Conflicts can come in many types and have many different causes. I will here focus on a specific 
type of conflict, namely ethnic civil war, where we have better sense of key important causes 
(see Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).  In our book on ethnic civil war (Cederman et al 
2013), we stressed inequality and the grievances they give rise to as key causes of violent ethnic 
conflict. Ethnic inequality can be both political or economic. An ethnic group may be 
systematically excluded from political influence in a state. Likewise, ethnic groups can be 
economically disadvantaged relative to dominant or privileged groups. Ethnic civil wars are 
important in terms of both absolute numbers and relative share. Until recently it has consistently 
been the case that more than 50% of ongoing civil wars involved distinct ethnic groups in 
conflict with a state (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig 2017). These conflicts typically 
center over claims for secession for a territory or greater autonomy. The growth we have seen in 
civil war after decolonization was overwhelmingly composed of ethnic civil wars.  
So, if inequality can motivate grievances and violent conflict, then is it also the case that 
we have had a decline in exclusion, and could this explain the decline in conflict? In order for 
this to be the case, we would need to have both a decline in motivating factors, and there would 
have to be discernably less conflict in the countries where we have had declines in exclusion. 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig (2017) show that this indeed is the case for instances 
where we have decreases in political exclusion. Figure 4 shows the average size proportion for 
ethnic groups that fall in different political status categories in a common data set called Ethnic 
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Power Relations (Vogt et al. 2015). These data indicate how ethnic groups can be excluded from 
political power or actively discriminated against. Alternatively, ethnic groups could be included 
and have access to political power. Beyond cases where a single group is dominant, we could 
also have powersharing between multiple groups, which we can think of as a form of ethnic 
pluralism as in countries such as Belgium. The size of groups matters since larger groups are 
more likely to have resources to fight against the state. Thus, groups that are large and excluded 
have both sufficient resources and motivation to rebel. Figure 4 shows that greater ethnic 
political inclusion and equality has become more common and widespread over time.  The share 
of groups in exclusive outcomes has declined, and the most severe form of discrimination is also 
much lower. By contrast, we have a clear increase in the proportional size of groups involved in 
some kind of powersharing. 
 
 
Figure 4: Trends in ethnic exclusion and power sharing 
 
The degree to which political institutions are democratic and allow political competition, 
also determines whether groups can pursue their aims by peaceful political means. Violence 
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becomes more likely when these opportunities do not exist in an autocracy. Figure 5 shows the 
proportion of countries considered democratic, using a common database on democratic 
institutions called the Polity data (Gleditsch and Ward 1997, Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Here again 
we can see that we have had an expansion of countries with democratic rule. From the 
perspective in our 2013 book (Cederman et al. 2013), we would expect these changes to be 
reflected in less violent ethnic conflict and more peaceful competition. 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of states considered democracies 
 
In Cederman et al. (2017) we try to look specifically at the cases where the status of 
ethnic groups have seen improvements, and then compare if we have fewer new violent conflict 
outbreaks and more conflicts termination there afterwards. And we indeed we find less conflict 
and more termination in cases where we have seen positive changes. Thus, the theory of 
inequality, exclusion and civil war is helpful not just to understand which countries see conflict, 
but also to reveal the possible conflicts that did not break out because the world changed.  
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To many, the idea of studying things that do not happen may seem odd and perhaps 
rather speculative. But much of our important knowledge is of this type.  We have all been told 
to wear seatbelts and that this save lives. Indeed, we currently get fined between £100-500 if we 
do not wear them while driving, and the UK government has since 2012 maintained a campaign 
called THINK! aimed at encouraging increased use.15 But how do we know that lives are saved, 
and how do we know how many lives may have been saved from the use of seatbelts?  
Remember that lives saved are accidents that could have been fatal but ultimate were not 
because something changed. In short, the estimates of lives save are roughly derived as follows: 
We compute a baseline fatal accident rate, with and without seatbelts. We then compute the 
difference based on the real world with seatbelts, and what we would see in a hypothetical world 
where the same number of trips are done and we have the same accident rate, but without the use 
of seatbelts.16 
Just as we both can and should evaluate the effects of seatbelts on road fatalities, we can 
think of conflicts that do not happen because of political reforms as a similar type of prediction 
problem. Cederman et al (2017) considers this by comparing estimates from two model and 
observed data and then comparing these to a forecast into the future. If we think of future trends 
as just as a mechanical extension of the past up to 1999, how much war would have expected to 
see in the following years? In Figure 6, this trend prediction, based on data up to 1999, is shown 
as dashed line in sample. We then show as an orange line the forecast derived from this for the 
                                                          
15 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/think-seat-belts. 
16 For a more detailed overview of the methodology, see the report from the US Department of 
Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration at 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811206. 
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subsequent years after 1999. We can see that we would have expected to observed a consistent 
high number violent ethnic conflict to remain high, without any real decrease over the period. 
We can then compare this to the predictions that we would get from a model that considers 
ethnic accommodation. This is shown as a solid line in the period up to 1999, and then as a green 
line in the forecast period after this. In the observed data period up to 1999 we do not see much 
divergence between the two model predictions, but they start to diverge after the Cold War, and 
dramatically so in the forecast period after 1999. Not only does the model taking into account 
ethnic accommodation predict a downward trend. It also fits better with the observed data, here 
shown as grey vertical bars for the number of conflicts. Thus, the evidence is consistent with 
more ethnic accommodation in this period leading to ethnic fewer civil wars.  
 
Figure 6: Trend versus accommodation model post 1999 predictions and data, from Cederman et 
al. (2017)  
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Some may contend that perhaps the declining trend and positive influences could be true 
for conventional civil war, but what about terrorism and the other security risks that many think 
we face here in the UK? Here, I would like to make two points. First, much of the terrorism in 
European countries currently emerges from civil war outside Europe. Thus, efforts to reduce the 
extent of civil war elsewhere can help to stem the risk of terrorism. Second, we can also see from 
the data in Figure 7 that we have that we have had much more terrorism in the past history of 
Europe, in particular during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Much of the terrorism at the peak was ethnic, involving groups such as the Corsicans in 
France, German speakers in Italy, or Catholics or Republicans in Northern Ireland (Engene 2005, 
Engene 2007, Gleditsch and Polo 2016, Polo and Gleditsch 2016). These ethnic conflicts did not 
become full civil wars and involved limited total battledeaths, but many groups such as the 
Republicans in Northern Ireland waged major terrorist campaigns. Indeed, the IRA campaign 
also involved attacks in places close to where we are today, such as Colchester Garrison.   
Gleditsch and Polo (2016) also find that the volume of ethnic terrorist attacks also 
declines after accommodation of ethnic groups. Our interpretation is that even if changes such as 
autonomy in Corsica and the Good Friday agreement do not satisfy the extremist, they do curtail 
recruitment, and this eventually decreases the number of attacks, even if the number of terrorist 
attacks may not go to exactly 0. We think this has more general applications for other types of 
terrorism too, including right-wing terrorism or Islamist groups.  
To be clear, terrorism is a serious problem, but if anything it seems less severe at the 
present than the past in Europe. There is little to justify elevating it to existential threat now, or to 
proclaim that we have clear growing risks of terrorism (see also Mueller and Stewart 2011, 
Mueller and Stewart 2015).  
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Fear of complacency vs. the perils of faith based policy  
Some people may argue that it is important to be worried about conflict to avoid complacency 
and lack of action. Clearly the press release for the United Nations and World Bank (2018) 
report on Pathways for Peace hoped that highlighting a bleak picture could help attract more 
interest and promote action. I agree that international efforts can play an important role in 
containing violent conflict, but it is not enough to just to have good intentions to do well.  
For example, during the Black Death in the 1300s it was common to think that disasters 
reflected sin. It was widely believed that the plague must be a punishment from God. If so, then 
it seems logical that the solution would be to show more devotion and pray, as confidently 
expressed in a quote from Bishop Edendon of Winchester in 1348.17  
this cruel plague has now begun a similarly savage attack upon the coastal areas of 
England. …  Sickness and premature death often come from sin and by the healing of 
souls, this kind of sickness is known to cease.  
Bringing people together to pray during the plague was clearly well intended. However, we now 
know that it was also counterproductive, as it promoted the spread of disease through human 
transmission (Dean et al. 2018). Clearly, good intentions alone do not guarantee good outcomes. 
This is true also in foreign policy. For example, the UK and France may well have had 
sincere intentions to protect civilians when they decided to launch a bombing campaign against 
in Libya in 2011. There was an impetus to do something, and surveys at the time suggested that 
proposals to bomb could have considerably popular support. However, in retrospect this seems 
very much like a faith-based initiative, without much assessment of the threat or consequences of 
                                                          
17 Quoted on http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/middle_ages/blackdisease_01.shtml 
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actions. The Foreign Affairs committee’s 2016 inquiry of the decision produced a report that was 
extremely critical.18 They argue that the campaign was conducted without any proper 
intelligence analyses or assessment of threats and consequences. The mission then drifted into an 
unannounced goal of regime change, with no prior debate. Moreover, it was noted that the 
intervening powers simply lost interest in the outcome following the fall of Gaddafi. 
Libya should be a chilling reminder that doing something well-intended could make 
things worse. Likewise, we are not taking conflict in any way more seriously by being more 
afraid of it. Indeed, stocking fear tends to produce paralysis or rash decisions rather than the 
rational and considered action that we seek. A better approach is to try to monitor the data to 
better to understand what has happened and to use data in ways that can help evaluate what can 
be done and likely consequences. Just as some data is better than anecdotes, more data can be 
much better then anecdotes. I have emphasized data on simple large-scale trends. However, we 
now have new sources of big and more detailed data on events in conflict, and other information 
such as information satellite data and news media can play in important role providing more real-
time information on conflict and actors. Of course, we need to understand the way that data 
becomes available to us and the possible filters in how information reaches us, but they open 
tremendous opportunities for more detailed analysis (see Guo, Gleditsch and Wilson 2018). 
Beyond showing trends in conflict and that the world is not ever more violent, I hope that 
I have convinced you of the value of looking at specific reasons for why conflict has declined. It 
is important to understand why we have had a decline in conflict precisely to identify what we 
may have done right, and how we may do even better (e.g., Mack 2002). We can make violence 
                                                          
18 For the full text, see 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/119/119.pdf. 
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more difficult for non-state actors by shoring by up the military capacity of states, as in the 
classic logic of deterrence and making conflict costly. But we can also make violence less 
attractive and likely by reducing motivation, and more ethnic accommodation is an important 
explanation for the decline of conflict (see Cederman et al. 2017). Similar perspectives on other 
varieties of violent conflict can also at least in principle help understand non-ethnic motives, why 
ongoing conflicts persist, and what would influence the actors to change their tactics.  
Policy relevance is ultimately a question of policy priorities and objectives. Research has 
much to tell us about means-ends relationship given objectives, but the specific objectives 
themselves must be specified in advance (Bueno de Mesquita, Newman and Rabushka 1985, 
Elster and Skog 1999, Manski 2013). Researchers can of course participate in debating what 
policy goals ought to be, but they have no particular competence in this area, nor should they 
hold a privileged position over others in determining goals or policy objectives. Many foreign 
policy controversies center on the weight that should be assigned to different priorities, and there 
is often an unclear mix of often competing objectives. How much should you emphasize 
minimizing violence or stability over promoting political change, for example, has surfaced 
repeatedly on debates on foreign interventions in Afghanistan and Syria.  
In the sustainable development goals many things are lumped together. Sustainable 
Development Goal number 16 alone for instance combines peace, justice and strong 
institutions.19 These outcomes may all be important priorities, but they are clearly not the same. 
If we can get all at the same time then that is of course great, but there may well be cases where 
one objective can be in conflict with another or potential trade-offs.  
                                                          
19 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-16-peace-
justice-and-strong-institutions.html 
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Still, in some cases the debates are, or at least should be, over the likely consequences, as 
in the case of Libya. Here, more structured predictive research can be very helpful. If we want to 
evaluate how say mediation or peacekeeping could have prevented escalating conflict, then we 
should try to use our knowledge about the past and devise explicit predictions and scenarios to 
justify the likely consequences (see Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015, Hegre, Hultman and Nygård 
2018). Politics may not be a science, but we can study politics scientifically. Political science 
cast this way can help clarify debates and disagreement and also inform politics. On this note, I 
conclude my lecture, and thank again for being awarded this professorship as well as your 
interest in this lecture. 
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